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Abstract. In this paper, we use a unique micro-level data set from Istanbul to
investigate the empirical relationship between inﬂation and price dispersion. In
particular, our data set includes price observations from three distinct store types:
bakkals (convenience stores), pazars (bazaars), and supermarkets. Our ﬁndings
indicate that pazars exhibit the least amount of price dispersion on average, which
is consistent with the fact that menu and search costs are very low in the pazar
and that such sellers seem to have very little market power. Moreover, we ﬁnd
that several of the basic inﬂation-dispersion channels identiﬁed by the theoretical
literature seem to be operating in our data.
Keywords: inﬂation, market structure, menu cost models, micro panel data, price
dispersion.
JEL Classiﬁcation Numbers: C23, D40, D83, E31.Information search, thus, is the really advanced art in the bazaar, a matter upon
which everything else turns.
Geertz (1978, p. 30), quoted in McMillan (2002, p. 41)
1. Introduction
The link between inﬂation and price dispersion has been the focus of an extensive
theoretical and empirical literature, which contributes to our understanding of the
distortionary eﬀects of inﬂation on the price system, as well as the transaction costs
of inﬂation. In this paper, we use a unique micro-level data set from Istanbul to
study the empirical relationship between inﬂation and dispersion, as well as the
systematic eﬀects of market structure on dispersion levels.
The theoretical literature (brieﬂy surveyed in the next section) includes static
(zero inﬂation) equilibrium search models, menu cost models, signal extraction mod-
els, and Van Hoomissen’s (1988) information investment model. The Reinganum
(1979) equilibrium search model explains the existence of persistent price dispersion
assuming imperfect information about prices, elastic demand, and heterogeneity in
ﬁrms’ production costs. In terms of comparative statics, dispersion is increasing in
the cost of search and decreasing in the elasticity of demand when prices are not
too low, where the latter result can be interpreted in terms of market power. For a
survey of this literature, see Baye, Morgan, and Scholten (2005).
In menu cost models such as Sheshinski and Weiss (1977, 1983) and B´ enabou
(1988, 1992), inﬂation is constant and fully anticipated. Nevertheless, dispersion
is increasing in expected aggregate or macroeconomic inﬂation, as well as menu and
search costs. Signal extraction models include B´ enabou and Gertner (1993) and
Dana (1994), where inﬂation is unanticipated and cost-push, reﬂected in ﬁrms’
production costs via input prices. In these models, the eﬀects of unanticipated
inﬂation are primarily informational so the relevant inﬂation rate is unexpected
product-speciﬁc (PS) inﬂation, since buyers in the market for good A should not
1be confused by unanticipated inﬂation in the market for good B. In particular,
the B´ enabou-Gertner model explains how a burst of unexpected PS inﬂation can
reduce the value of search, inducing greater price dispersion. As in the Reinganum
model and menu cost models, dispersion is increasing in the cost of search. In
the information investment model sketched in Van Hoomissen (1988), search not
only lowers the current purchase price, it is also an investment which adds to the
consumer’s stock of information. In that model, dispersion is increasing in expected
PS inﬂation (which proxies the depreciation rate of information), unexpected PS
inﬂation (a negative shock to information stocks), and lagged dispersion (reﬂecting
the pre-search stock of information).
The empirical literature includes Domberger (1987), Van Hoomissen (1988),
Lach and Tsiddon (1992), Tommasi (1993), and Parsley (1996), among others.1
With some notable exceptions, including Reinsdorf (1994), the consensus seems to
be that there is a positive relationship between inﬂation and dispersion. However,
the actual inﬂation measure used diﬀers from study to study. Some authors regress
dispersion against PS inﬂation (i.e., price dispersion for good i is related to i’s
inﬂation rate), while others use average inﬂation across all goods in the data set,
or some broader measure such as CPI inﬂation. Although the theoretical literature
is not suﬃciently well-developed to subject the disparate models to full empirical
testing, some researchers decompose inﬂation (whether PS, average, or aggregate)
into its expected and unexpected components in order to test the basic implications
of menu cost and signal extraction models. Again, the consensus seems to be that
dispersion is positively related to its expected and unexpected components.
Motivated by the theoretical literature, in this paper we estimate an empirical
model relating price dispersion to expected and unexpected PS inﬂation, as well as
expected and unexpected aggregate inﬂation. We use a broad-based cost-of-living
1 In this paper, we focus exclusively on price dispersion, or intra-market relative price vari-
ability. There is also a substantial literature on inter-market relative price variability, including
Vining and Elwertowski (1976), Parks (1978), and Debelle and Lamont (1997).
2(COL) index for Istanbul to proxy the “aggregate” price level (CPI inﬂation yielded
similar results). A basic implication of menu cost and signal extraction models is
that dispersion should be positively related to expected COL and unexpected PS
inﬂation, respectively. We also include expected PS inﬂation and lagged dispersion
in the speciﬁcation, since the information investment model suggests that dispersion
should be positively associated with these variables. Finally, we add unexpected
COL inﬂation to test the hypothesis that market participants are not fooled by
unanticipated aggregate inﬂation. Strikingly, our empirical ﬁndings support all of
these hypotheses, the only exception being that there is no statistically signiﬁcant
relationship between dispersion and expected PS inﬂation. We conclude that many
of the basic inﬂation → dispersion channels identiﬁed by the theoretical literature
seem to be at work in our data set.
A unique aspect of our data set is that it includes three distinct store types
— bakkals (small mom-and-pop convenience stores), pazars (bazaars), and super-
markets — which allows us to test whether there are any systematic diﬀerences in
dispersion levels across these three distinct market structures. The role of search
and information in the bazaar is discussed in Geertz (1978) and highlighted in
McMillan’s popular book “Reinventing the Bazaar: A Natural History of Markets”
(2002, Chapter 4). Interestingly, we ﬁnd that dispersion in pazar prices is signif-
icantly lower on average than the other two store types. This is intuitive, since
menu costs are negligible in the pazar. Moreover, pazars contain a large number
of sellers within a very small geographical area, resulting in very low search costs
and relatively ﬁerce competition. We also ﬁnd that dispersion in bakkal prices is on
average less than dispersion in supermarket prices. This ﬁnding also makes sense,
since bakkals are convenience stores (low search costs) where menu costs are likely
to be small.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we survey the relevant
theoretical literature. In section 3, we describe the data, provide institutional details
for the three market structures in our data set, and deﬁne the relevant independent
3and dependent variables. For comparison purposes, in section 4 we use our data set
to estimate some commonly used speciﬁcations of the relationship between inﬂation
and dispersion. We present our new empirical speciﬁcation in section 5 and discuss
our ﬁndings. Section 6 concludes.
2. Theoretical Literature
Static Equilibrium Search Models
The literature on equilibrium search models with sequential search includes Rein-
ganum (1979), Rob (1985), B´ enabou (1993), and Rauh (2005), among many others.
A major goal of this class of models is to explain the existence and determinants of
observed persistent price dispersion for seemingly homogeneous goods.2 In the Rein-
ganum model, a continuum of ﬁrms produce a homogeneous good under constant
returns to scale. A continuum of ex ante identical buyers have constant elasticity
demand q(p) = p, where  < −1. Buyers have imperfect information about prices
in the sense that they are assumed to know the cumulative distribution function F
of prices, but not the price proﬁle that generates it (they don’t know which ﬁrm is
charging what price). Given search cost c > 0, it is well-known that buyers’ optimal
reservation level is given by
Z r
0
q(p)F(p)dp = c. (1)
Baye, Morgan, and Scholten (2005) show that dσ2/dr > 0 and dr/dc > 0, where σ2
is the variance of equilibrium prices, so dispersion is increasing in the cost of search
in the Reinganum model.
Since our data set contains sellers with varying degrees of market power, we
are also interested in the relationship between dispersion and the constant elasticity
2 Although inﬂation is assumed to be zero in this class of models, this literature is still rele-
vant for explaining the vertical intercept terms in empirical models (dispersion when the various
components of the inﬂation measures are zero).
4of demand. As far as we know, this issue has not yet been explored in the litera-
ture. We now show that dσ2/d < 0 when the Reinganum model is appropriately








Since c > 0, (1) ensures the denominator is positive. A suﬃcient condition for the







be no less than one, where m is the marginal cost of the lowest cost ﬁrm. A suﬃcient
condition is therefore m ≥ (1 + )/. Other normalizations give the same result.
Menu Cost Models
We focus on the B´ enabou (1988, 1992) menu cost models, which extend the seminal
contribution of Sheshinski and Weiss (1977) to consider search and price dispersion.
In these models, inﬂation is assumed to be constant and fully anticipated. Given
non-zero menu costs, ﬁrms ﬁnd it suboptimal to increase prices in lock-step with
inﬂation and instead follow optimal (S,s) pricing strategies. An increase in expected
inﬂation induces ﬁrms to widen their (S,s) bands to conserve on menu costs, thereby
increasing dispersion. During deﬂationary periods, the model works in reverse, so
there is a V-shaped relationship between dispersion and expected inﬂation in menu
cost models: dispersion is increasing in the absolute value of expected inﬂation.
Moreover, dispersion is increasing in the cost of search and menu costs.
In empirical work, one is confronted by several distinct inﬂation rates: PS inﬂa-
tion (inﬂation rates for each individual good in the sample), average inﬂation over
all goods in the sample, and inﬂation rates constructed from COL and CPI indices.
To reduce the number of potential empirical relationships, it is therefore important
to determine which type of inﬂation is meant by any particular theory. In the case of
5menu cost models, expected inﬂation acts to depreciate the real purchasing power
of revenues.3 Indeed, Sheshinski and Weiss (1977) explicitly consider expected ag-
gregate or macroeconomic inﬂation, while the B´ enabou menu cost models focus on
expected inﬂation in input prices.4 For example, consider an individual seller in
the pazar. Even if this seller obtains his or her apples from an independent grower,
that seller will be sensitive to more than just apple inﬂation: increases in general
food expenses, dwelling expenses, and other COL categories will all induce the seller
to increase price. A similar statement applies to bakkals, which are almost always
family-owned and operated. Of course, a seller’s ability to successfully raise price
will be tempered by search and competitive pressures.
Although menu cost models are too stylized for full empirical testing, we can
still test the basic hypothesis that there is a positive relationship between dispersion
and the permanent component of some aggregate inﬂation measure. In this paper,
we test this hypothesis using a broad-based COL index for Istanbul (using national
CPI inﬂation produced qualitatively similar empirical results).
Signal Extraction Models
The literature on search and unanticipated inﬂation includes B´ enabou and Gertner
(1993) and Dana (1994). For concreteness, we focus on the B´ enabou-Gertner model,
which assumes sequential search and that inﬂation is cost-push and unexpected:
marginal costs are subject to inﬂation shocks via input prices. The signal extraction
aspect of the model is that a consumer who observes a high price at a particular
seller must infer to what extent that high price is due to unexpected inﬂation,
as opposed to idiosyncratic factors. If the consumer believes the former is more
likely, then the expected beneﬁt of search is lower, and less search induces greater
3 See the ﬁrst equation in the proof of theorem 2.1 in B´ enabou (1988, p. 369).
4 The B´ enabou menu cost models study the long-run steady-state where PS inﬂation equals
macroeconomic inﬂation, but this is unlikely to hold in real-world data sets and may not hold in
more general theoretical models.
6dispersion in equilibrium.5 The B´ enabou-Gertner model therefore formalizes the
traditional view that unexpected inﬂation (or unexpected deﬂation) can increase
dispersion by reducing the expected beneﬁt of search. Furthermore, dispersion is
increasing in the cost of search as in previous models.
In contrast with menu cost models, where the relationship between inﬂation
and dispersion is essentially technological (driven by the existence and magnitude
of menu costs), in signal extraction models the relationship is informational. It
therefore seems clear that the relevant inﬂation rate for signal extraction models
is unexpected PS inﬂation: a rational consumer searching for good A should not
be fooled by unexpected inﬂation in the market for good B, where “fooled” means
allowing her statistical inferences about the expected beneﬁt of search for A to be
clouded by idiosyncratic events in the market for B (any common component should
already be reﬂected in A’s prices). Of course, real-world consumers may not be
that rational, so we include both unexpected PS and COL inﬂation in our empirical
model to test this hypothesis. Indeed, we ﬁnd that unexpected COL inﬂation plays
no signiﬁcant role in the relationship between inﬂation and dispersion.
Information Investment Model
In the above models, individual consumers only purchase the good once. In contrast,
Van Hoomissen (1988) poses the repeat-purchase search problem as an optimal
investment decision where search not only reduces the current purchase price, but
also adds to the consumer’s stock of information. This stock depreciates because
information can be forgotten or become obsolete. In particular, an increase in
5 In contrast, B´ enabou and Gertner show that when the search cost is suﬃciently low, an
increase in unexpected inﬂation can induce greater search and lead to higher welfare in equilibrium.
This has led some researchers to conjecture that an increase in unexpected inﬂation might reduce
dispersion in their model. However, there are no analytical or simulations results or claims to that
eﬀect in the B´ enabou-Gertner paper, and our analysis of their Tables 1-3 on p. 85-86 shows that
dispersion increases in all cases, even when search costs are low. [However, we did not consider
the mixed-strategy (type 4) equilibria in the intermediate search cost case.] Hence, the notion
that unexpected inﬂation might reduce dispersion remains a conjecture. We have beneﬁtted from
correspondence with Roland B´ enabou on this point.
7inﬂation increases the depreciation rate on information, inducing consumers to hold
smaller information stocks, which should increase current and future dispersion.
Here, the relevant inﬂation measure is expected PS inﬂation, since one can only
discount based on anticipated inﬂation and because information about one good
should not depreciate with inﬂation in other markets. The information investment
model also predicts that current dispersion should be positively related to lagged
dispersion, since the latter reﬂects consumers’ pre-search stock of information.6
Furthermore, unexpected PS inﬂation causes a temporary reduction in information
stocks, which may increase dispersion in current and future periods while they are
being replenished.
Summary and Objectives
Menu cost models, signal extraction models, and the information investment model
focus on diﬀerent aspects of the inﬂation-dispersion relationship: menu cost models
analyze the eﬀects of expected macroeconomic inﬂation from a technological point
of view, while the latter consider the eﬀects of inﬂation from an informational point
of view. Signal extraction models consider the relationship between dispersion and
unexpected PS inﬂation, while the information investment model incorporates both
expected PS inﬂation (which proxies the depreciation rate on information) and
unexpected PS inﬂation, and also suggests a role for lagged dispersion. According
to static equilibrium search models, dispersion is increasing in the cost of search
(as in menu cost and signal extraction models) and decreasing in the elasticity of
demand (provided equilibrium prices are not too low).
Given the current state of the theoretical literature, we cannot subject the
disparate models to full empirical testing. On the other hand, regressions involving
the expected and unexpected components of some inﬂation measure, essentially
arbitrarily chosen, do not adequately capture the richness of the existing theoretical
6 Since the model is recursive (the state is lagged dispersion, the current pre-search stock of
information), the model does not suggest a role for additional lags.
8literature. In this paper, we estimate an empirical speciﬁcation including all of
these variables, as well as unexpected COL inﬂation to test the hypothesis that
consumers are not fooled by unanticipated macroeconomic inﬂation. The goal is to
identify which of the basic forces suggested by the theory seem to be at work in our
data, which should serve as a guide in the development of a uniﬁed theory of the
relationship between inﬂation and price dispersion.
3. Data and Deﬁnitions
Data
The data consist of monthly price observations for 58 distinct products, mostly food-
stuﬀs, listed in appendix A. These observations span the period 1992:10 to 2000:06,
during which the average inﬂation rate was high but relatively stable at about 60%
per annum.7 The Istanbul Chamber of Commerce collects this data to construct a
broad-based COL index for wage earners in Istanbul, which we also use. The 58
products listed in appendix A comprise 25% of the entire COL index.8 Whenever
possible, the data collectors visited the same seller to record price observations on
the same product (same brand, quantity/weight, and other characteristics).
Each price entry pijkt in our data set is indexed by the product i, the neigh-
borhood (borough) j in Istanbul where it was collected, the store type k, and the
month t. Each entry was collected from one of three distinct store types: bakkals,
pazars, and supermarkets.9 Bakkals are relatively small convenience stores which
are almost always family-owned and operated. They tend to be concentrated in
residential areas and to be separated from one another by short walking distances
7 The stability of inﬂation during the sample period may be signiﬁcant, since Caglayan and
Filiztekin (2003) have shown that the empirical link between inﬂation and dispersion can break
down in the presence of large structural breaks.
8 The COL index includes the following categories: Food; Dwelling Expenses; Household Ex-
penses; Clothing, Health, and Personal Care; Transportation and Communication; Culture, Edu-
cation, and Entertainment; and Other.
9 Note that all of these store types are major institutions with many customers, so our results
are not biased due to a lack of consumers for some store type.
9(e.g., a few blocks). Bakkals are also local institutions with an important social
dimension, as customers tend to drop in to buy one or two items and exchange
news and gossip with the owner. Pazars are classic Middle-Eastern-style bazaars
selling fresh produce and small consumer items. These markets approach the per-
fectly competitive ideal, since vendors operate small stalls selling 1-4 items each,
and each product generally has several sellers within a very small geographical area
(approximately two acres for a large pazar in Istanbul). There is one main pazar in
each neighborhood, open one day a week. Turkish supermarkets are similar to their
Western counterparts. They are relatively large, corporate-owned, and stock a wide
variety of distinct products and brands. As in the US, they tend to isolate them-
selves geographically from similar sellers. Fischer and Harrington (1996) document
this phenomenon for a major US city (Baltimore).
The theoretical literature highlights three main parameters or characteristics of
market structure: menu costs, search costs, and market power. In these dimensions,
pazars approach the perfectly competitive ideal. Menu costs are negligible, and the
high density of sellers results in relatively ﬁerce competition with very low search
costs. Recall that the cost of search is the opportunity cost of obtaining another
price quote. If one seller in the pazar quotes a high price for apples, the prospective
buyer knows that there are several other sellers nearby (usually in plain sight).
Despite very low search costs, price dispersion is a persistent phenomenon in the
pazar.
The market structure for bakkals is roughly monopolistic competition. Their
products are diﬀerentiated spatially and also in the social dimension. As a result,
bakkals enjoy some market power and people tend to patronize their “favorite”
bakkal. Although menu costs are low, search costs can be signiﬁcant. If a particular
bakkal quotes a high price, the nearest alternative seller is generally another bakkal,
which may be several blocks away.
Supermarkets are very diﬀerent. As B´ enabou (1992, p. 303) emphasizes, menu
costs incorporate all costs of changing prices, including decision costs. Since super-
10markets stock a large array of diﬀerent products and brands, menu costs are likely
to be signiﬁcant (recall that inﬂation averaged 60% over the sample). Moreover, the
fact that supermarkets tend to be geographically isolated from other sellers means
that search costs are generally substantial: obtaining another price quote usually
entails a trip by car or public transportation. Since many Turkish consumers rely on
the latter, search costs may be fairly high indeed. Finally, the geographical density
of bakkals is signiﬁcantly greater than that for supermarkets, so spatial product dif-
ferentiation may be even more important for the latter. The fact that supermarkets
advertise and employ marketing strategies such as running “loss leaders” indicates
that supermarkets enjoy some market power.
Based on these characterizations, one would expect pazar prices, on average,
to exhibit the least amount of dispersion due to their relatively small menu and
search costs and relative absence of market power. In fact, our estimates support
this hypothesis. The other two market structures are less clear-cut. What we ﬁnd
is that the market structures can be ranked (pazars < bakkals < supermarkets) in
terms of average price dispersion. The latter result is understandable, in light of the
fact that supermarkets are likely to have higher associated search and menu costs
than bakkals.
Issues
A potential problem with the pazar data is that, although pazar vendors are legally
required to post explicit prices, the actual purchase price may be determined by
haggling, whereas our data set only records the posted prices. Nevertheless, we
believe the pazar data to be useful, because the issues involved in setting the posted
prices are similar to those in menu cost and signal extraction models. In particular,
consumers will make signal extraction-type inferences based on the posted prices.10
10 In signal extraction models, buyers use the posted price and the ﬁrm’s equilibrium strategy
to make inferences about the ﬁrm’s cost. The latter are then used to make inferences about other
ﬁrms’ costs and prices, which informs the buyer’s decision concerning additional search.
11Furthermore, the posted price will have to be set competitively, since if it is too
high, the seller will attract little buyer interest, and if it is too low, proﬁts will be
reduced because the actual price will not exceed the posted one. Hence, the posted
prices should be useful for testing the basic hypotheses of menu cost and signal
extraction models, even if the actual and posted prices diﬀer.
In fact, actual purchase prices determined by haggling are usually fairly close
to the posted ones. As Geertz (1978, p. 32) notes, “most bazaar ‘price negotiation’
takes place to the right of the decimal point”. Our own casual observation suggests
that in the morning, when the Chamber inspectors reportedly collect the data, the
bulk of the transactions occur at the posted price. Haggling is more important in
the afternoon, when sellers are eager to get rid of their stocks. For the sceptical
reader, in appendix B we report our ﬁndings following the same empirical analysis
as in the text, except that only the bakkal and supermarket data are used (haggling
is not a feature of these markets). The results are essentially the same. See tables
B1, B2 in appendix B, which correspond to tables 1, 2 in the main text.
Another issue relates to the fact that consumers generally shop for baskets of
goods at the supermarket. Presumably, supermarkets take advantage of this fact
through general pricing strategies (e.g., loss leaders), as well as individual product
marketing strategies. If so, then our price observations may not be completely
independent. We ﬁrst note that strategic linkages between price levels may not
translate to linkages in price dispersion. Nevertheless, the problem may manifest
itself via heteroskedasticity, which we will be careful to control for. We also note
that such linkages are much less of an issue for bakkals and pazars, since most
consumers only buy one or two items from these sellers (although one can purchase
many items from the pazar, individual sellers in the pazar stock only a few items).
Deﬁnitions
We make the standard deﬁnition that the relative price of product i in neighborhood
12j sold by store type k in month t is deﬁned by












is the average price of the product at date t, J = 15 is the number of neighborhoods,



















Some empirical studies use relative price change variability to measure dispersion
as opposed to relative price level variability as deﬁned in (6). However, as Reinsdorf
(1994, Section IV) emphasizes, the theoretical literature refers speciﬁcally to relative
price level variability. Indeed, these two dispersion measures are not equivalent and
may have diﬀerent relationships with inﬂation, so in this paper we only refer to
relative price level variability as deﬁned in (6). The PS inﬂation rate for product i












πijkt = ln[pijkt/pijk(t−1)]. (9)
11 Alternatively, one could deﬁne separate PS inﬂation rates for each store type. Although
regressing store-type dispersion against store-type PS inﬂation seems more parsimonious than using
overall PS inﬂation, there is no theoretical basis for using such narrow inﬂation variables. From
the perspective of signal extraction models, using store-type PS inﬂation would imply, for example,
that a consumer who observes high apple prices at the pazar would not use this information to
make inferences about bakkal apple prices.
13Expected and Unexpected Inﬂation
The theoretical literature refers to the expected and unexpected components of in-
ﬂation, so we need to decompose both COL and PS inﬂation into their permanent
and transitory components. For purposes of comparison, we follow the same pro-
cedure used in Lach and Tsiddon (1992) and Reinsdorf (1994). According to this
procedure, we regress PSt against PSt−1,PSt−2,... up to six lags, past values of
COL inﬂation up to three lags, and deterministic components including a constant,
linear trend, and time dummies. For each product i, the appropriate lag length
and the choice of which deterministic components to include is determined by the
well-known Schwarz Information Criterion. For each estimation, the residuals are
tested for serial correlation and autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity up to
six lags. If the residuals are clean with respect to these anomalies at conventional
signiﬁcance levels, the ﬁtted values are used as the expected inﬂation series EPSt
and the residuals are taken to be unexpected inﬂation UPSt. If the serial correla-
tion or ARCH tests failed, we used the second-best speciﬁcation according to the
Schwarz Information Criterion, and so on. The same procedure was used to decom-
pose COL inﬂation into its expected ECOLt and unexpected UCOLt components
except that only past values of COL inﬂation were used, along with deterministic
components including a constant, linear trend, and time dummies.12
4. Common Speciﬁcations
We begin our empirical analysis with a very basic speciﬁcation, common in the
literature:












Tn + β |PSit| + uit (10)
where Vit is dispersion as deﬁned in (6), α is a constant, |PSit| is the absolute value
of PS inﬂation, and uit is the error term. We take the absolute value of PSit, since
12 The details of the decomposition procedure are available from the authors upon request.
14all the theoretical models discussed in section 2 predict a V-shaped relationship
between dispersion and the relevant inﬂation variable. The model also includes
dummy variables to control for ﬁxed eﬀects speciﬁc to particular products λi, store
types θk (where k = b,p,s for bakkal, pazar, and supermarket, respectively), months
τl, and years Tn.
The estimates for this ﬁxed-eﬀects regression model are reported in Table 1,
column 1.
Table 1 Goes Here
The estimate for θs (denoted by “dmrk” in the table) is positive and signiﬁcant
at the 1% level, indicating that supermarkets exhibit greater dispersion on average
than bakkals, ceteris paribus. Similarly, θp (denoted by “dpaz”) is negative and
signiﬁcant, indicating that pazars exhibit less dispersion than bakkals. We there-
fore ﬁnd the ranking (pazars < bakkals < supermarkets) with respect to average
dispersion levels. The result that pazars exhibit the least amount of dispersion is
consistent with their characterization in terms of relatively ﬁerce competition (high
spatial density) and very low search and menu costs. The ﬁnding that supermarkets
exhibit more dispersion than bakkals may reﬂect casual observation that supermar-
kets seem to have higher menu and search costs. Given their greater numbers and
relatively higher spatial density, bakkals may essentially be monopolistic competi-
tors with less market power than supermarkets, which are corporate oligopolists.
Overall, these estimates conﬁrm the visual evidence in Figure 1 below, which plots
dispersion across time for each store type.
Figure 1 Goes Here
The coeﬃcient β on |PSt| characterizes the relationship between PS inﬂation and
dispersion for this model. The estimate for β is positive and signiﬁcant at the 1%
level, which agrees with the usual ﬁnding that there is a V-shaped relationship
between dispersion and PS inﬂation.
15Asymmetric Impact of Inﬂation vs. Deﬂation
As Jaramillo (1999) demonstrates, conclusions about the empirical relationship be-
tween inﬂation and dispersion can hinge on the proper treatment of outliers, espe-
cially those corresponding to deﬂationary episodes. In order to properly account
for these, we introduce a dummy variable D<0 which equals 1 when PS inﬂation is
negative (deﬂation) and zero otherwise:












Tn + β |PSit| + γ D<0 |PSit| + uit. (11)
This model therefore allows for an asymmetric V-shaped relationship between dis-
persion and PS inﬂation.
The estimates are reported in Table 1, column 2. We observe that β and
γ are positive and signiﬁcant at the 1% and 5% levels, respectively, indicating an
asymmetric V-shaped relationship. Speciﬁcally, a unit increase in inﬂation increases
dispersion by about β = 0.043, while a unit increase in deﬂation increases dispersion
by about β+γ = 0.06. Similar asymmetries, involving a larger change in dispersion
for increases in deﬂation, have been reported by Reinsdorf (1994) and Jamarillo
(1999).
Expected and Unexpected Inﬂation
We now estimate a speciﬁcation similar to that in Lach and Tsiddon (1992, Table
2) and Reinsdorf (1994), which relates dispersion to expected and unexpected PS
inﬂation:
Vit = β1 |EPSit| + β2 |UPSit| + γ1 D<0 |EPSit| + γ2 D<0 |UPSit| + uit. (12)
As before, we allow for an asymmetric V-shaped relationship between dispersion and
each inﬂation variable. We also include a constant as well as product, store-type,
and time dummies, but for simplicity we do not display them.13
13 From now on, we refrain from displaying these variables, although they always enter the
estimation procedure.
16In Table 1, column 3, the estimates for β1, β2, and γ1 are all positive and
signiﬁcant at the 5% level or better. We therefore ﬁnd a symmetric V-shaped
relationship between dispersion and unexpected PS inﬂation and an asymmetric
V-shaped relationship between dispersion and expected PS inﬂation, with a steeper
slope for expected PS deﬂation. These ﬁndings are again similar to much of the
existing empirical literature and have generally been interpreted as supporting the
basic implications of menu cost and signal extraction models. These results are
also consistent with the information investment model, where |EPS| proxies the
depreciation rate on information.
Lagged Dispersion
From a theoretical perspective, the information investment model suggests that
current dispersion should be negatively related to consumers’ information stocks,
whose opposite (ignorance) can be proxied by lagged dispersion. Hence, current
dispersion should be positively related to lagged dispersion. From an econometric
point of view, visual inspection of Figure 1 indicates some persistence, so failing
to include lagged dispersion may lead to biased and inconsistent estimates. We
therefore add Vt−1 to the model in (12):
Vit = β0 Vi(t−1)+β1 |EPSit|+β2 |UPSit|+γ1 D<0 |EPSit|+γ2 D<0 |UPSit|+uit. (13)
The model now has a dynamic structure, and we use the one-step GMM estimation
procedure for dynamic panels analyzed in Arellano and Bond (1991).14
In Table 2, column 1, we observe that β0 is positive and signiﬁcant at the 1%
level, so current and lagged dispersion are indeed positively related.
14 Arellano and Bond (1991) report that the Sargan test has asymptotic chi-squre distribution
only if the error terms are homoskedastic, and that it over-rejects the null hypothesis of valid
instruments in the presence of heteroskedasticity, which seems likely for our sample. Furthermore,
they recommend using one-step results for inference on coeﬃcients, as the estimated standard
errors from the two-step method would be downward biased. We adopt this suggestion, and
present one-step estimation results while implementing the Huber-White robust standard error
estimation procedure to control for possible heteroskedasticity. All computations were performed
by STATA, where lagged values of the inﬂation variables and the lagged dependant variable were
used as instruments.
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Interestingly, β1 and γ1 are now insigniﬁcant, whereas before they were positive and
signiﬁcant. In other words, incorporating lagged dispersion removes any statistically
signiﬁcant relationship between dispersion and expected PS inﬂation. On this basis,
it might be tempting to reject the basic implication of menu cost models. However,
in the next section we show that there is a positive and signiﬁcant relationship
between dispersion and expected COL inﬂation, as hypothesized in our survey of
the theoretical literature. In our view, these ﬁndings cast substantial doubt on
previous work which neglects lagged dispersion. The results for β2 and γ2 are
qualitatively the same as before, so there is still a symmetric V-shaped relationship
between dispersion and unexpected PS inﬂation.
5. A New Speciﬁcation
Despite its fragmented nature, the theoretical literature oﬀers a richer set of inﬂation
→ dispersion channels than the previous speciﬁcations allow. We therefore propose
the following:
Vit =β0 Vi(t−1) + β1 |EPSit| + β2 |UPSit| + β3 |ECOLt| + β4 |UCOLt|+
γ1 D<0 |EPSit| + γ2 D<0 |UPSit|+
γ3 D<0 |ECOLt| + γ4 D<0 |UCOLt| + uit. (14)
This speciﬁcation includes the two main explanatory variables highlighted by the
information investment model: lagged dispersion and expected PS inﬂation. As in
previous speciﬁcations, unexpected PS inﬂation captures the adverse informational
eﬀects of unanticipated inﬂation which are the central focus of signal extraction
models and represents temporary shocks to information stocks in the information
investment model. We use expected COL inﬂation to proxy anticipated aggregate
inﬂation, the main driving force in menu cost models. In all cases, we allow for
18asymmetric V-shaped relationships. Finally, we include unexpected COL inﬂation
to test the basic hypothesis that consumers are not fooled by changes in unan-
ticipated aggregate inﬂation, which should be irrelevant from a signal extraction
perspective.15
The estimates for β0, β1, β2, γ1, and γ2 in column 2, Table 2, are qualitatively
the same as in column 1, so we obtain the same results as before: dispersion is posi-
tively associated with lagged dispersion, there is a symmetric V-shaped relationship
between dispersion and unexpected PS inﬂation, and no statistically signiﬁcant re-
lationship with expected PS inﬂation.
With respect to COL inﬂation, β3 is positive and signiﬁcant at the 1% level,
indicating a V-shaped relationship between dispersion and expected COL inﬂation,
as hypothesized by menu cost models. Since our data set contains only two observa-
tions of expected COL deﬂation, testing for an asymmetric relationship is equivalent
to testing whether those two observations are inﬂuential outliers, as Jaramillo (1999)
points out. This is indeed the case, since γ3 is positive and signiﬁcant at the 1%
level. It also hints at an asymmetric relationship, with a steeper slope for expected
COL deﬂation. Note that Jaramillo, who had more deﬂationary observations to
work with, found just such a relationship between dispersion and aggregate inﬂa-
tion. As for unexpected COL inﬂation, β4 and γ4 are both insigniﬁcant, which
suggests unexpected COL inﬂation has little or no impact on dispersion, as hypoth-
esized. In a nutshell, our ﬁndings indicate support for all of the basic inﬂation →
dispersion channels identiﬁed by the theoretical literature, except for the coeﬃcient
on expected PS inﬂation.
6. Conclusions
The current consensus in the empirical literature seems to be that there is a posi-
15 We do not include lagged inﬂation variables in (14), since those eﬀects should already be
captured by lagged dispersion. Indeed, Vi(t−1) is the key theoretical lagged variable, since it proxies
consumers’ information stocks at date t, and may incorporate other factors besides inﬂation, such
as the eﬀects of supermarket advertising.
19tive association between inﬂation and price dispersion. Moreover, once inﬂation is
statistically decomposed into its expected and unexpected components, there also
seems to be a positive relationship between dispersion and anticipated and unantic-
ipated inﬂation. Despite its disparate nature, the theoretical literature helps us to
understand certain aspects of this relationship, where menu cost models focus on
anticipated inﬂation and signal extraction models on unanticipated inﬂation.
In this paper, we investigate potential linkages between inﬂation and price
dispersion using a relatively rich empirical framework, as compared with previous
studies. In practice, researchers are confronted with a variety of diﬀerent inﬂation
rates, and diﬀerent empirical studies have used diﬀerent inﬂation measures with
little or no discussion or justiﬁcation. A central lesson of the present paper is that
price dispersion can have diﬀerent relationships with diﬀerent inﬂation measures.
For example, we ﬁnd no statistically signiﬁcant relationship between dispersion
and expected PS and unexpected COL inﬂation, but a positive and signiﬁcant
relationship with the absolute values of expected COL and unexpected PS inﬂation.
The choice of inﬂation measure therefore matters and should be guided by theory.
In our survey of the theoretical literature, we argued that menu cost models
refer to expected aggregate inﬂation and signal extraction models to unexpected
PS inﬂation. We have also drawn attention to Van Hoomissen’s (1988) informa-
tion investment model, which suggests a role for lagged dispersion. Strikingly, our
empirical results support most of the basic implications one can identify from the
existing theoretical literature. However, Reinsdorf (1994) reports a negative rela-
tionship between inﬂation and dispersion, which may be inconsistent with existing
theory (see footnote 5). In our view, his analysis is incomplete since it does not
include lagged dispersion or aggregate inﬂation.
Another novel feature of the present paper is our investigation of the impact
of market structure on average dispersion levels. A unique aspect of our data set is
that it includes price observations from three distinct market structures: bakkals,
pazars, and supermarkets. These three store types should exhibit considerable
20variation in the main parameters and characteristics identiﬁed by the theoretical
literature: menu costs, search costs, and market power. This gives us the rare
opportunity to put the main insights of the equilibrium search literature to the
test: by all accounts, we should expect ex ante that pazars should exhibit the least
amount of price dispersion on average, which is indeed what we ﬁnd.
In conclusion, we are encouraged by these ﬁndings, since most of the basic
implications of the theoretical literature are supported by the data. On the other
hand, our research highlights the need for a uniﬁed theoretical framework which
incorporates the main insights of menu cost models, signal extraction models, and
the information investment model. Indeed, our results suggest that all of these
elements are necessary for a complete understanding of the relationship between
inﬂation and price dispersion. In the meantime, we hope our ﬁndings on the complex
linkages between inﬂation, price dispersion, and market structure will stimulate
more empirical research along these lines.
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24Appendix A
Table A: Products
Product Mean Inﬂation stdev Product Mean Inﬂation stdev
Rice 0.0486 0.0485 Roasted chick peas 0.0523 0.0496
Pasta 0.0457 0.0544 Walnuts 0.0564 0.0930
Flour 0.0452 0.0361 Raisins 0.0473 0.0451
Baklava 0.0508 0.0317 Apple 0.0509 0.1394
Cookies 0.0508 0.0317 Lemon 0.0453 0.1304
Flodougha 0.0472 0.0347 Tomato 0.0497 0.2703
Cracked wheat 0.0487 0.0304 Green peppers 0.0396 0.3354
Veal 0.0472 0.0386 Cucumbers 0.0409 0.2619
Chicken 0.0446 0.0818 Lettuce 0.0420 0.1472
Mutton 0.0472 0.0411 Zucchini 0.0395 0.2209
Fish 0.0545 0.1898 Scallion 0.0456 0.1722
Sucukb 0.0489 0.0343 Olives 0.0488 0.0232
Oﬀalc 0.0476 0.0448 Honey 0.0496 0.0344
Salami 0.0479 0.0319 Tomato paste 0.0464 0.0610
Sausage 0.0453 0.0283 Halvahd 0.0472 0.0482
Feta cheese 0.0464 0.0388 Jam 0.0469 0.0360
Margarine 0.0501 0.0519 Ready soup 0.0462 0.0300
Cooking oil 0.0485 0.0572 Broom 0.0505 0.0503
Eggs 0.0400 0.1307 Cleaning powder 0.0496 0.0344
Olive oil 0.0504 0.0579 Soap 0.0477 0.0477
Kasari cheese 0.0481 0.0555 Detergent 0.0451 0.0367
Potato 0.0474 0.1125 Bleach 0.0497 0.0316
Onion 0.0530 0.1695 Paper tissue 0.0501 0.0431
Lentils 0.0489 0.0527 Light bulbs 0.0390 0.0417
Chick peas 0.0541 0.0569 Plastic kitchenware 0.0495 0.0388
Dried beans 0.0525 0.0610 Toothpaste 0.0489 0.0404
Sunﬂower seeds 0.0460 0.0420 Toilet soap 0.0470 0.0468
Peanuts 0.0493 0.0470 Shampoo 0.0436 0.0532
Hazelnuts 0.0599 0.1127 Razor 0.0523 0.0579
a A very thin sheet of dough. b A type of sausage. c Sheep viscera. d A type of sweet.Appendix B: regressions without pazar data.
Table B1: Panel data ﬁxed eﬀects estimation results
Eq.(10) Eq.(11) Eq.(12)










D ∗ |EPS| 0.053
[0.018]***
D ∗ |UPS| 0.000
[0.011]
Constant 0.078 0.078 0.070
[0.004]*** [0.004]*** [0.006]***
Observations 8464 8464 8207
R2 0.37 0.37 0.37
Standard errors in brackets
* signiﬁcant at 10%; ** signiﬁcant at 5%; *** signiﬁcant at 1%
Variable deﬁnitions are given in the text.Appendix B: regressions without pazar data.








D ∗ |EPS| 0.020 0.024
[0.036] [0.035]






D ∗ |ECOL| 0.463
[0.309]
D ∗ |UCOL| -0.025
[0.034]
Observations 8115 7952
Standard errors in brackets
* signiﬁcant at 10%; ** signiﬁcant at 5%; *** signiﬁcant at 1%
Variable deﬁnitions are given in the text.
The numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors from Arellano-Bond one-step GMM estimation.Table 1: Panel data ﬁxed eﬀects estimation results.
Eq.(10) Eq.(11) Eq.(12)
dmrk 0.014 0.014 0.014
[0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.001]***










D ∗ |EPS| 0.026
[0.012]**
D ∗ |UPS| -0.001
[0.009]
Constant 0.089 0.089 0.088
[0.002]*** [0.002]*** [0.002]***
Observations 10672 10672 10341
R2 0.10 0.10 0.10
Standard errors in brackets
* signiﬁcant at 10%; ** signiﬁcant at 5%; *** signiﬁcant at 1%
Time and market type product dummies are included in all regressions.Table 2: Panel data dynamic GMM estimation results.
Eq.(13) Eq.(14)






D ∗ |EPS| 0.017 0.014
[0.024] [0.024]






D ∗ |ECOL| 1.195
[0.342]***
D ∗ |UCOL| -0.004
[0.028]
Observations 10,225 10,022
Standard errors in brackets
* signiﬁcant at 10%; ** signiﬁcant at 5%; *** signiﬁcant at 1%
The numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors from Arellano-Bond one-step GMM estimation.